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Abstract
We study a special case of Willems’s two-user multi-access channel with partially cooperating
encoders from a security perspective. This model differs from Willems’s setup in that only one encoder,
Encoder 1, is allowed to conference; Encoder 2 does not transmit any message, and there is an additional
passive eavesdropper from whom the communication should be kept secret. For the discrete memoryless
(DM) case, we establish inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region. The inner bound
is based on a combination of Willems’s coding scheme, noise injection and additional binning that
provides randomization for security. For the memoryless Gaussian model, we establish lower and upper
bounds on the secrecy capacity. We also show that, under certain conditions, these bounds agree in some
extreme cases of cooperation between the encoders. We illustrate our results through some numerical
examples.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally security in communication networks is achieved through encryption algorithms,
implemented in the upper layers of the protocol stack. Wyner introduced a basic information-
theoretic model to study security by exploiting the physical layer attributes of the channel [1]. The
wiretap channel studied by Wyner consists of a source, a destination (legitimate receiver) and an
eavesdropper. The source communicates with the destination, and wishes to conceal the messages
that it sends from the eavesdropper. Wyner establishes the secrecy capacity of this model, i.e., the
maximum amount of information that can be sent from the source to the destination while leaking
absolutely no information to the eavesdropper, in the discrete memoryless (DM) case when the
source-to-eavesdropper channel is a degraded version of the source-to-destination channel. The
secrecy capacity of the memoryless Gaussian version of Wyner’s wiretap model is obtained in
[2]. In [3], Csisza´r and Ko¨rner generalize Wyner’s wiretap model to a broadcast model with
confidential messages (BCC). In this model, the source communicates with two destinations; it
sends two messages, a common message that is intended to be decoded by both destinations as
well as an individual message that is intended to be decoded by only one destination and be kept
secret from the other destination. For the transmission of the individual message, the destination
that recovers only the common message then plays the role of an eavesdropper. Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner characterize the capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy capacity region of the
studied broadcast model with confidential messages.
The seminal work by Wyner has been extended to a variety of models, including the parallel
broadcast channel with confidential messages [4], the multi-antenna wiretap channel [5]–[7],
the multi-access wiretap channel [8]–[10], the relay-eavesdropper channel [11]–[15], the parallel
relay-eavesdropper channel [16], the interference channel with confidential messages [17]–[20]
and the fading wiretap channel [21], [22]. The reader may refer to [23] for recent advances on
aspects related to information-theoretic security.
In this work, we investigate the problem of secure communication over a multi-access channel
(MAC) with partially cooperating encoders. The MAC with partially cooperating encoders and
no security constraints was studied by Willems in [24]. In this model, prior to transmitting
their respective messages, the two encoders are allowed to communicate with each other over
noiseless bit-pipes of finite-capacities. Willems characterizes the complete capacity region of this
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Fig. 1. Multi-access channel with partially cooperating encoders and security constraints.
model for the DM case. In [25], Bross et al. establish the capacity region of the memoryless
Gaussian version of Willems’s model. In both [24] and [25], among other observations, it is
shown in particular that holding a conference prior to the transmission, enlarges the capacity
region relative to the standard MAC with independent inputs.
We study a special case of Willems’s setup with an additional security constraint on the
communication. More specifically, as shown in Figure 1, we consider a two-user multi-access
channel in which the two users can cooperate partially through a unidirectional noiseless bit-pipe
of finite capacity C12. Also, we restrict the role of Encoder 2 to only helping Encoder 1, i.e.,
Encoder 2 has no message of its own to transmit. Furthermore, we assume that there is a passive
eavesdropper who overhears the transmission and from whom the communication should be kept
secret. The eavesdropper is passive in the sense that it only listens to the transmitted information
without modifying it. The role of Encoder 2 is then to only help Encoder 1 communicate with
the legitimate receiver while keeping the transmitted information secret from the eavesdropper.
From a practical viewpoint, this model may be appropriate for example for the study of the role
of backbone connections among base stations for securing transmission in cellular environments.
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In this paper, we study the capacity-equivocation region of this model.
The MAC model that we study in this paper has some connections with a number of related
works studied previously. Compared with the orthogonal relay-eavesdropper channel studied in
[15], the orthogonal link between the source and the relay is replaced here by a noiseless bit-
pipe of finite capacity C12. Compared with the wiretap channel with a helper interferer (WT-HI)
studied in [17], our model permits cooperation among the encoders. Finally, compared with
the primitive relay channel of [26], our model imposes security constraints on the transmitted
message.
Contributions. Our main contributions in this paper can be summarized as follows. For the DM
case, we establish outer and inner bounds on the capacity-equivocation region. The coding scheme
that we use for the inner bound is based on an appropriate combination of Willems coding scheme
[24], noise injection [14, Theorem 3] and binning for randomization. We obtain our converse
proof by extending the converse proof of [24] to account for the security constraint and that of
[3] to account for the unidirectional noiseless bit-pipe cooperation among the encoders. In doing
so, we show that one needs to redefine the involved auxiliary random variables appropriately.
We note that characterizing the capacity-equivocation region of our model in the general setting
is not easy; and, in fact, the capacity-equivocation region or secrecy-capacity of closely related
models that are reported in the literature, such as [17], [27], [28], are still to be found – the
model of [17] can be seen as a special case of our model obtained by taking a noiseless bit-pipe
of zero capacity. From this perspective, the inner and outer bounds that we develop here can be
seen as one step ahead towards a better understanding of the full capacity-equivocation region
of the model that we study in this paper.
Next, we study the Gaussian memoryless model. In this case, we focus only on perfect secure
transmission. For this model, we establish lower and upper bounds on the secrecy capacity.
The coding scheme that we use to establish the lower bound uses ideas that are essentially
similar to those for the DM case. The upper bound on the secrecy capacity does not involve
auxiliary random variables and, so, is computable. Furthermore, it has the same expression as the
secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel with a two-antenna transmitter, single-antenna
legitimate receiver and single-antenna eavesdropper [5]–[7].
We show that our lower bound performs well in general and is optimal in some extreme
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cases of cooperation among the encoders, including when the two encoders fully cooperate,
i.e., C12 := ∞. For the case in which the two encoders do not conference, i.e., C12 := 0, the
model that we study reduces to a wiretap channel with a helper interferer [17], [27]. In this case,
our coding scheme reduces to merely injecting statistically independent noise [14, Theorem 3];
and, by comparing it to the upper bound that we develop, we show that it is optimal under
certain conditions. For the case of full cooperation among the encoders, i.e., C12 := ∞, our
coding scheme reduces to full two-antenna cooperation for providing secrecy in the context of
multi-antenna wiretap channels [5]–[7].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a formal description of the
channel model. In section III, we study the DM setting, and establish inner and outer bounds
on the capacity-equivocation region. In section IV, we establish lower and upper bounds on
the secrecy-capacity for the memoryless Gaussian model, and study some extreme cases of
cooperation among the encoders. We illustrate these results through some numerical examples
in section V. Section VI concludes the paper.
Notations. In this paper, the notation Xn is used as a shorthand for (X1, X2, . . . , Xn), the
notation Xni is used as a shorthand for (Xi, Xi+1, . . . , Xn), the notation X n is used as a
shorthand for (X1 × X2 . . . × Xn), the notation |X | denotes the cardinality of set X , E{.}
denotes the expectation operator, N (µ, σ2) denotes the Gaussian distribution with µ-mean and
σ2-variance, the boldface letter X denotes the covariance matrix; H(·), h(·) denote the entropy
of the discrete and continuous random variables respectively and I(X ; Y ) defines the mutual
information between random variable X and Y . We define the functions C(x) = log2(1+x) and
[x]+ = max{0, x}. Throughout the paper the logarithm function is taken to the base 2.
II. CHANNEL MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
Consider the model depicted in Figure 1. Encoder 1 wishes to send a confidential message to
the legitimate receiver, in the presence of a passive eavesdropper that overhears the transmitted
information and cannot modify it. In doing so, Encoder 1 can get help from a second encoder,
Encoder 2, to whom it is connected through a noiseless bit pipe of finite capacity C12. Encoder
2 has no message of its own to transmit, and is dedicated entirely to help Encoder 1 conceal its
message from the eavesdropper. The eavesdropper is assumed to be of unlimited computational
complexity and is fully informed about the codebooks used at the encoders.
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More formally, let W denote the message to be transmitted, taken uniformly from the set
W = {1, . . . , 2nR}. Encoder 1 is allowed to conference the message W to Encoder 2 using K
communicating functions {φ11, φ12, . . . , φ1K}, over the noiseless bit-pipe. Let G1k := φ1k(W ),
defined as the output of the communication process for the k-th communication, where G1k
ranges over the finite alphabet G1k, k = 1, . . . , K. The information conferenced is bounded
due to the finiteness of noiseless bit-pipe capacity between the two encoders. A conference is
permissible if communication functions are such that
K∑
k=1
log |G1k| ≤ nC12. (1)
To transmit the message W , Encoder 1 sends a codeword Xn1 ∈ X n1 , where X1 designates the
input alphabet at Encoder 1. Encoder 2 transmits a codeword Xn2 ∈ X n2 where X2 designates the
input alphabet at Encoder 2. Let Y and Z designate the output alphabets at the legitimate receiver
and eavesdropper, respectively. The legitimate receiver gets the channel output Y n ∈ Yn, and
tries to estimate the transmitted message from it. The eavesdropper overhears the channel output
Zn ∈ Zn. The transmission over the channel is characterized by the memoryless conditional
probability p(y, z|x1, x2). The channel is memoryless in the sense that
p(yn, zn|xn1 , x
n
2 ) =
n∏
i=1
p(yi, zi|x1,i, x2,i). (2)
Definition 1: A (2nR, n) code for the multi-access model with partially cooperating encoders
shown in Figure 1 consists of encoding functions1
φ1 : W −→ X
n
1 ,
φ1k : W −→ G1k, k = 1, ..., K,
φ2 : {1, . . . , 2
nC12} −→ X n2 , (3)
and a decoding function ψ(·) at the legitimate receiver
ψ : Yn −→W. (4)
1The source encoder, φ1, and helper encoder, φ2, are stochastic encoders that introduce additional randomization to increase
secrecy.
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Definition 2: The average error probability for the (2nR, n) code is defined as
P ne =
1
2nR
∑
W∈W
Pr{Wˆ 6= W |W}. (5)
The eavesdropper overhears to what the encoders transmit and tries to guess the information
from it. The equivocation rate per channel use is defined as Re = H(W |Zn)/n.
Definition 3: A rate-equivocation pair (R,Re) is said to be achievable if for any ǫ > 0 there
exists a sequence of codes (2nR, n) such that for any n ≥ n(ǫ)
H(W )
n
≥ R− ǫ,
H(W |Zn)
n
≥ Re − ǫ,
P ne ≤ ǫ. (6)
Definition 4: The secrecy capacity is defined as the maximum achievable rate at which the
communication rate is equal to the equivocation rate, i.e., (R,Re) = (R,R).
III. DISCRETE MEMORYLESS CASE
In this section we establish outer and inner bounds on the capacity-equivocation region for
the MAC with partially cooperating encoders shown in Figure 1.
A. Outer Bound
The following theorem provides an outer bound on the capacity-equivocation region of the
MAC with partially cooperating encoders and security constraints shown in Figure 1.
Theorem 1: For the MAC with partially cooperating encoders and security constraints shown
in Figure 1, and for any achievable rate-equivocation pair (R,Re), there exist some random
variables U ↔ (V1, V2)↔ (X1, X2)↔ (Y, Z), such that (R,Re) satisfies
R ≤ min{I(V1, V2; Y ), I(V1; Y |V2) + C12}
Re ≤ R
Re ≤ min{I(V1, V2; Y |U)− I(V1, V2;Z|U), I(V1; Y |V2, U) + C12 − I(V1, V2;Z|U)}. (7)
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Proof: The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix I.
Remark 1: The proof of Theorem 1 extends the converse proof of [3] to the case of two
encoders, and extends the converse proof of [24] so as to account for the imposed security
constraint. Furthermore, the outer bound of Theorem 1 reduces to the secrecy capacity of Wyner’s
wiretap channel [1] by removing the helping encoder, Encoder 2.
Remark 2: In the special case in which C12 := 0, the model in Figure 1 reduces to a
transmitter (Encoder 1) sending a confidential message to its intended receiver in the presence of
a passive eavesdropper and with the help of an external independent interferer (Encoder 2). This
model is referred to as being a wiretap channel with a helping interferer (WT-HI), and is studied
in [17], [27]. The capacity-equivocation region of the WT-HI is still unknown. In [17], and also
[27], the authors derive achievable secrecy rates as well as computable upper bounds on the
secrecy capacity of the WT-HI. The outer bounds of [17], [27] are of Sato-type. By specializing
the outer bound of Theorem 1 to the case C12 := 0, one readily obtains an alternative outer
bound on the capacity equivocation region of the WT-HI. It is not easy to compare the obtained
outer bound with the outer bounds of [17], [27], since the former involves auxiliary random
variables.
B. Inner Bound
We now turn to establish an inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region of the MAC
with partially cooperating encoders and security constraints shown in Figure 1. The following
theorem states the result.
Theorem 2: For the MAC with partially cooperating encoders and security constraints shown
in Figure 1, the rate pairs in the closure of the convex hull of all (R,Re) satisfying
R ≤ min{I(V1, V2; Y |U), I(V1; Y |V2, V, U) + C12}
Re ≤ R
Re ≤ [min{I(V2; Y |V, U), I(V2;Z|V1, V, U)}+min{I(V1, V2; Y |U), I(V1; Y |V2, V, U) + C12}
− I(V1, V2;Z|U)]
+ (8)
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for some measure p(u, v, v1, v2, x1, x2, y, z) = p(u)p(v|u)p(v1|v, u)p(v2|v, u)p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2)
.p(y, z|x1, x2), are achievable.
Outline of Proof:
We briefly outline the coding scheme that we use to prove the achievability of the inner bound of
Theorem 2, and relegate the details of the proof to Appendix II. The inner bound of Theorem 2 is
based on a coding scheme that consists in appropriate careful combination of Willems’s coding
scheme [24], noise injection [14, Theorem 3] and binning for randomization to provide security.
Let W denote the message to be transmitted. Using the noiseless bit-pipe of finite capacity,
Encoder 1 conferences a part of the information message W to Encoder 2. After completion of
the conferencing process, this part can be regarded as a common information to be transmitted by
both encoders. The random variable V in Theorem 2 represents this common information. The
part of the information message that is sent only by Encoder 1 can be regarded as an individual
message. The random variable V1 in Theorem 2 represents this individual information. The input
of Encoder 2 is composed of the common information, which it has received through noiseless
finite capacity link from Encoder 1, and a statistically independent artificial noise component.
The random variable V2 in Theorem 2 represents the input from Encoder 2. The transmission of
both common information and artificial noise components at Encoder 2 in Theorem 2 is adjusted
by appropriate selection of random variable V . Additional random binning is employed to secure
both individual and common information from the passive eavesdropper [1]. Finally, the random
variable U in Theorem 2 stands for a channel prefix.
Remark 3: The region established in Theorem 2 reduces to the special case R2 = 0 of
the capacity region of the MAC with cooperating encoders and no security constraints in [24,
Theorem 1] by setting Re := 0, U :=constant, V1 := X1 and V = V2 = X2 in (8).
Remark 4: As we indicated previously, in the special case in which C12 := 0, the model of
Figure 1 reduces to a wiretap channel with a helping interferer (WT-HI). By setting Re := R
(i.e., restricting to the case of perfect secrecy) and U = V = φ in (8), we obtain the following
lower bound on the secrecy capacity of the WT-HI,
Re ≤ max [min{I(V1, V2; Y )− I(V1, V2;Z), I(V1; Y |V2)− I(V1;Z)}]
+ (9)
where the maximization is over joint measures of the form p(v1)p(v2)p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2). In [17],
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the authors establish several achievable secrecy rates for the WT-HI for different regimes of the
relative strength of the interference. The lower bound 9 has an expression that is essentially
similar to one that is developed for the case of a strong interference regime in [17, Section
III-C]; but is potentially larger since it involves auxiliary random variables V1 and V2 in place of
the inputs X1 and X2 in [17, Section III-C]. The specific choice V1 := X1 and V2 := X2 gives
the lower bound of [17, Section III-C] in the case of strong interference.
IV. MEMORYLESS GAUSSIAN MODEL
In this section, we study the Gaussian version of the MAC with partially cooperating encoders
and security constraints shown in Figure 1. We only focus on the case of perfect secrecy.
A. Channel Model
For the Gaussian model, the outputs of the MAC at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper
for each symbol time are given by
Y = h1dX1 + h2dX2 +N1
Z = h1eX1 + h2eX2 +N2 (10)
where h1d, h2d, h1e, and h2e are the channel gain coefficients associated with Encoder 1-to-
destination (1-D), Encoder 2-to-destination (2-D), Encoder 1-to-eavesdropper (1-E), and Encoder
2-to-eavesdropper (2-E) links respectively. The noise processes {N1,i} and {N2,i} are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d) with the components being zero mean Gaussian random
variables with variances σ21 and σ22 , respectively; and X1,i and X2,i are the channel inputs from
Encoder 1 and Encoder 2 respectively. The channel inputs are bounded by average block power
constraints
n∑
i=1
E[X21,i] ≤ nP1,
n∑
i=1
E[X22,i] ≤ nP2. (11)
B. Upper Bound on the Secrecy Capacity
In this section, we establish an upper bound on the secrecy capacity on Gaussian MAC (10).
We establish a computable upper bound using the techniques developed earlier to establish the
secrecy capacity of a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel [5]–[7] — taking
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a setup with two antennas at the transmitter, one antenna at the legitimate receiver and one
antenna at the eavesdropper in our case.
Corollary 1: For the Gaussian MAC with partially cooperating encoders and security
constraints (10), an upper bound on the secrecy capacity is given by
Rupe = max
ψ
[I(X1, X2; Y )− I(X1, X2;Z)] (12)
where [X1, X2] ∼ N (0,KP) with KP =
{
KP : KP=
[
P1 ψ
√
P1P2
ψ
√
P1P2 P2
]
, −1 ≤ ψ ≤ 1
}
, with
E[X21 ], E[X
2
2 ] satisfying (11).
Alternatively, we can also establish the upper bound (12) from the rate-equivocation region
established for the DM case in Theorem 1, as follows. Taking the first term of minimization in
the bound on the equivocation rate in Theorem 1, we get
Re ≤ max [I(V1, V2; Y |U)− I(V1, V2;Z|U)] (13)
where U ↔ (V1, V2)↔ (X1, X2) ↔ (Y, Z). The rest of the proof closely follows the bounding
technique established in [16], in the context of a parallel relay-eavesdropper channel. More
specifically, continuing from (13) we get
Re ≤ I(V1, V2; Y |U)− I(V1, V2;Z|U)
(a)
≤ I(V1, V2; Y )− I(V1, V2;Z)
≤ I(V1, V2; Y, Z)− I(V1, V2;Z)
(b)
= [I(X1, X2; Y, Z)− I(X1, X2; Y, Z|V1, V2)]− [I(X1, X2;Z)− I(X1, X2;Z|V1, V2)]
= [I(X1, X2; Y, Z)− I(X1, X2;Z)]− [I(X1, X2; Y, Z|V1, V2)− I(X1, X2;Z|V1, V2)]
≤ I(X1, X2; Y, Z)− I(X1, X2;Z)
= I(X1, X2; Y |Z) (14)
where (a) follows from the fact that the difference of conditional mutual information
I(V1, V2; Y |U)− I(V1, V2;Z|U) is maximized by U := constant and (b) holds since (V1, V2)↔
(X1, X2)↔ (Y, Z) is a Markov chain.
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Now, the upper bound in (14) can be tightened by using an argument previously used in [5], [6]
in the context of multi-antenna wiretap channel. Noticing that the upper bound (13) depends on
p(y, z|x1, x2) only through its marginals p(y|x1, x2) and p(z|x1, x2), the upper bound (14) can
be further tightened as
Re ≤ min
p(y′,z′|x1,x2)
max
p(x1,x2)
I(X1, X2; Y
′|Z ′) (15)
where the joint conditional p(y′, z′|x1, x2) has the same marginals as p(y, z|x1, x2), i.e.,
p(y′|x1, x2) = p(y|x1, x2) and p(z′|x1, x2) = p(z|x1, x2).
Following [5], [6], it can be shown that the bound in (15) is maximized with the jointly
Gaussian inputs [X1, X2] ∼ N (0,KP), with E[X21 ] and E[X22 ] satisfying (11).
Finally, evaluation of the upper bound (15) with these jointly Gaussian inputs and then the
minimization over all possible correlations between Y ′ and Z ′ yield the desired result.
C. Lower Bound on the Secrecy Capacity
For the Gaussian MAC with partially cooperating encoders and security constraints (10), we
obtain a lower bound on the secrecy capacity by using our result for the DM model in Theorem
2. The results established for the DM case can be readily extended to memoryless channels with
discrete time and continuous alphabets using standard techniques [29, Chapter 7].
Corollary 2: For the Gaussian MAC with partially cooperating encoders and security
constraints (10), a lower bound on the secrecy capacity is given by
Rlowe = max
0≤α≤1,
0≤β≤1

min

C

 β|h2d|2P2
σ21 + α|h1d|
2P1

, C

β|h2e|2P2
σ22




+min

C

α|h1d|2P1
σ21

+ C12, C

 |h1d|2P1 + |h2d|2P2 + 2
√
α¯β¯|h1d|2P1|h2d|2P2
σ12




− C

 |h1e|2P1 + |h2e|2P2 + 2
√
α¯β¯|h1e|2P1|h2e|2P2
σ22




+
. (16)
Proof: The achievability follows by computing the inner bound in Theorem 2 with the choice
U := constant, V1 := X1 and V2 := X2, X1 :=
√
(αP1)X˜1 +
√
(α¯P1)V , X2 :=
√
(βP2)X˜2 +
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√
(β¯P2)V , where X˜1, X˜2 and V be independent random variables with N (0, 1), and α ∈ [0, 1],
α¯ := 1− α, β ∈ [0, 1], and β¯ := 1− β. Straightforward algebra that is omitted for brevity gives
(16).
D. Analysis of Some Extreme Cases
In this section we study two special cases of the Gaussian MAC (10) with partially cooperating
encoders shown in Figure 1, where the capacity of the bit-pipe is either,
1) C12 = 0, or
2) C12 = ∞.
The first case corresponds to the wiretap channel with a helping interferer (WT-HI) studied in
[17], [27] . The second case corresponds to a two-antenna transmitter wiretap channel [6], [30].
1) Case C12 := 0: In this case the encoders do not cooperate. Since Encoder 2 does not know
the common information to transmit, it only injects statistically independent artificial noise.
Corollary 3: For the Gaussian model (10) with C12 := 0:
1) An upper bound on the secrecy capacity is given by
Rupe = max
E[X2
1
]≤P1,
E[X2
2
]≤P2

C
(
|h1d|2E[X21 ]
σ21
)
− C
(
|h1e|2E[X21 ]
σ22 + |h2e|
2E[X22 ]
)
+
. (17)
2) A lower bound on the secrecy capacity is given by
Rlowe = max

C
(
|h1d|2E[X21 ]
σ21
)
− C
(
|h1e|2E[X21 ]
σ22 + |h2e|
2E[X22 ]
)
+
(18)
where the maximization is over E[X21 ] ≤ P1 and E[X22 ] ≤ P2 such that
C
(
|h2d|2E[X22 ]
|h1d|2E[X21 ] + σ
2
1
)
≥ C
(
|h2e|2E[X22 ]
σ22
)
. (19)
Proof: Upper Bound. We bound the term in (17) as follows. The proof follows by using
elements from an upper bounding technique developed in [15]. We assume that there is a noiseless
link between Encoder 2 and the legitimate receiver, and the eavesdropper is constrained to treat
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Encoder 2’s signal as unknown noise. The upper bound established for this model, with full
cooperation between Encoder 2 and the legitimate receiver and a constrained eavesdropper, also
applies to the model of Corollary 3.
With full cooperation between Encoder 2–legitimate receiver link, the legitimate receiver can
remove the effect of Encoder 2 transmission from the output Y of the MAC (10) (since the input
from Encoder 2 is independent from Encoder 1 transmission because C12 = 0). The equivalent
channel model at the legitimate receiver is then given by
Y ′ = h1,dX1 +N1. (20)
The eavesdropper is constrained in the sense that it is restricted not to decode Encoder 2 signals.
For the constrained eavesdropper Encoder 2’s transmission acts as unknown noise, the worst case
is obtained with the X2 being Gaussian distributed [15]. The equivalent channel model at the
eavesdropper is given by
Z ′ = h1,eX1 + h2,eX2︸ ︷︷ ︸
unknown noise
+N2. (21)
The equivalent channel model, with full cooperation between Encoder 2-to-legitimate receiver
link and worst case Encoder 2-to-constrained eavesdropper transmission, reduces to the Gaussian
wiretap channel, the secrecy capacity of which is established in [2], i.e.,
Cs = max
p(x1)p(x2)
I(X1; Y
′)− I(X1;Z ′) (22)
where X1 ∼ N (0, P1), and X2 ∼ N (0, P2).
Straightforward algebra shows that the computation of (22) gives (17).
Lower Bound. The proof of the lower bound follows by evaluating the equivocation rate in
Theorem 2 with a specific choice of the variables. More specifically, evaluating Theorem 2 with
the choice C12 := 0, U = V = φ, V1 := X1 and V2 := X2, with X1 ∼ N (0, P1) independent of
X2 ∼ N (0, P2), and such that (19) is satisfied, we obtain the rate expression in (18). The RHS
of (18) then follows by maximization over E[X21 ] ≤ P1 and E[X22 ] ≤ P2 and satisfying (19).
Remark 5: The bounds on the secrecy capacity in (17) and (18) have identical expressions
but the maximization is over different sets of inputs. The bounds coincide in the case in which
the inputs (E[X21 ],E[X22 ]) that maximize the RHS of (17) also satisfy the condition (19). In this
TO APPEAR IN IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 14
case, the perfect secrecy of the studied model is given by
Cs = max

C
(
|h1d|2E[X21 ]
σ21
)
− C
(
|h1e|2E[X21 ]
σ22 + |h2e|
2E[X22 ]
)
+
(23)
where the maximization is over E[X21 ] ≤ P1 and E[X22 ] ≤ P2 satisfying
C
(
|h2d|2E[X22 ]
|h1d|2E[X21 ] + σ
2
1
)
≥ C
(
|h2e|2E[X22 ]
σ22
)
. (24)
2) Case C12 := ∞: As stated previously, in this case the model (10) reduces to a wiretap
channel in which the transmitter equipped with two antenna and the legitimate receiver and
eavesdropper equipped with single antennas. As it will be shown below, in this case the
upper bound of Corollary 1 and the lower bound of Corollary 2 coincide, thus providing a
characterization of the secrecy capacity, which can also be obtained from [6], [7] in this specific
case.
Corollary 4: For the Gaussian model (10) with fully cooperating encoders, the secrecy
capacity is given by
Cs = max
ψ
[I(X1, X2; Y )− I(X1, X2;Z)] (25)
where [X1, X2] ∼ N (0,KP) with KP =
{
KP : KP=
[
P1 ψ
√
P1P2
ψ
√
P1P2 P2
]
, −1 ≤ ψ ≤ 1
}
, with
E[X21 ] and E[X22 ] satisfying (11).
Proof: The upper bound follows by Corollary 1. The proof of the lower bound follows by
evaluating the equivocation rate in Theorem 2 with a specific choice of the random variables.
More specifically, the rate expression (25) is obtained by setting C12 := ∞, U := constant,
V1 := X1, V = V2 = X2, in Theorem 2 where [X1, X2] ∼ N (0,KP) with KP =
{
KP : KP=[
P1 ψ
√
P1P2
ψ
√
P1P2 P2
]
, −1 ≤ ψ ≤ 1
}
and E[X21 ] and E[X22 ] satisfying (11).
With straightforward algebra, it can be checked that this corresponds also to the special case
C12 :=∞ in Corollary 2.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide some numerical examples to illustrate our results. We consider
the Gaussian MAC (10) in which the outputs at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper are
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Fig. 2. Bounds on the secrecy capacity.
corrupted by additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) of zero mean and unit variance each. We
model channel gains between node i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {d, e} as distance dependent path loss,
hi,j = d
−γ/2
i,j , where γ is the path loss exponent. We assume that both users have an average
power constraint of 1 watt each and the path loss exponent γ:=2. We consider a network geometry
in which Encoder 1 is located at the point (0, 0), Encoder 2 is located at the point (d, 0), the
legitimate receiver is located at the point (1, 0) and the eavesdropper is located at the point
(1.5, 0), where d is the distance between Encoders 1 and 2. The upper (12) and the lower (16)
bounds are optimized numerically for Gaussian inputs. Figure 2 shows the upper and lower
bounds on the secrecy capacity for different values of finite capacity link. As a reference we
consider the case in which there is no helping Encoder, i.e., a basic wiretap channel. If we set
C12 := 0, Encoder 1 does not conference to Encoder 2, for this setup the MAC (10) reduces to
the classic WT-HI [17], [27]. In this case Encoder 2 can help Encoder 1 by injecting confusion
codewords to confuse the eavesdropper [14, Theorem 3].
Figure 3 shows the power splitting at Encoder 2 to transmit conferenced information and
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destination is located at (1, 0) and the eavesdropper is located at (1.5, 0).
artificial noise in (16), for different values of C12. The region between 0.9 < d < 1.1 is
of particular interest where Encoder 2 is near to the destination. It can be easily seen that
when helping encoder, Encoder 2, is near to the destination no power is allocated to transmit
the conferenced information to the legitimate receiver and the lower bound is maximized by
independent inputs. Roughly speaking, this follows because when Encoder 2 is near to the
destination noise injection provides higher secrecy rates.
If we increase the capacity of noiseless bit-pipe, the achievable secrecy rate increases, this
follows because Encoder 2 is more informed about the information message from Encoder 1
and can cooperate with each other. For instance, if we consider a very large value of noiseless
bit-pipe capacity, the upper and lower bounds will eventually coincide. This is due to the fact
that a large value of C12 results in full cooperation between the encoders, due to which the
channel at hand reduces to a two-antenna transmitter wiretap channel for which secrecy capacity
is established (Corollary 4).
TO APPEAR IN IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 17
−0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 30
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
 
 
PSfrag replacements
Encoder 1 DestinationEavesdropper
Upper Bound (12)
Lower Bound (16), C12 := 0
Lower Bound (16), C12 := 1
Lower Bound (16), C12 := 4
Lower Bound (16), C12 := 6
Wiretap Channel
Pe
rfe
ct
Se
cr
ec
y
R
at
e
(bi
ts
/c
ha
n
n
el
u
se
)
Location of Encoder 2
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Next, we consider a network geometry in which the eavesdropper is geographically placed
at a more favorable location compared to the legitimate receiver. In this setting, compared to
the earlier example we reverse the location of the destination and the eavesdropper, where the
eavesdropper is located at the point (1, 0) and the legitimate receiver is located at the point
(1.5, 0). Figure 4 shows the optimized upper (12) and lower (16) bounds for this case with
different values of the finite capacity link. As a benchmark, similar to the previous example, we
also plot the case in which there is no helper encoder (wiretap channel). From Figure 4 it can be
seen that in the absence of the helper encoder, it is not possible to obtain positive secrecy rates.
This follows due to the fact that since the eavesdropper is located at a better position compared
to the legitimate receiver, it can easily decode all the transmitted information. Roughly speaking,
in this case degradedness condition is violated. With the presence of the helper Encoder, even
though the eavesdropper is at a more favorable position compared to the legitimate receiver,
one can still obtain positive secrecy rates. This follows because, in this setting Encoder 2 can
help the legitimate receiver by injecting statistically independent artificial noise to confuse the
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eavesdropper which in turns provides higher secrecy rates [14, Theorem 3]. From Figure 4, one
can also see that for large values of C12, the secrecy rate increases. This follows, since Encoder
2 is more informed about the confidential messages at the Encoder 1, cooperation between
Encoders can provides higher secrecy rates (Corollary 4). Figure 5 shows the power splitting
at Encoder 2 to transmit conferenced information and artificial noise for the new setup. In this
setting, when the Encoder 2 is located between the eavesdropper and the legitimate receiver, it
uses full power to inject artificial noise to confuse the eavesdropper which provides higher rates.
VI. CONCLUSION
We studied a special case of Willems’s multi-access channel with partially cooperating
encoders [24] in the presence of a passive eavesdropper, from a security viewpoint. For the
general DM case, we established outer and inner bounds on the capacity-equivocation region. The
inner bound is obtained by a combination of Willems’s coding scheme, injection of statistically
independent artificial noise [14, Theorem 3] and binning for security. The outer bound is obtained
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by extending outer bounding techniques that are developed previously in the context of broadcast
channels with confidential messages and Willems’s model to the studied model. The developed
outer and inner bounds do not agree in general, but can be seen as a step ahead towards
characterizing the capacity-equivocation region. For the Gaussian setup, we focus on the case
of perfectly secure transmission, and establish lower and upper bounds on the secrecy capacity.
We also study some extreme cases of cooperation between the encoders. For the case in which
the encoders do not cooperate the considered setup reduces to wiretap-channel with an external
helper interferer, a setup whose secrecy capacity is still unknown [17], [27], [28]. For this
particular setup, we show that under certain conditions our lower and upper bounds coincide,
and so we characterize the secrecy capacity fully. For the case of full cooperation between the
encoders, the studied setup reduces to a wiretap channel in which the transmitter is equipped with
two-antenna, and the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper are equipped with single antennas. In
this case, the developed bounds agree, and so we obtain the secrecy capacity expression.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The converse uses elements from the proof given in the context of broadcast channels with
confidential messages [3] and the proof established in the context of multiple access channel
with partially cooperating encoders [24]. We begin the proof by first setting W12 := GK1 .
Bounds on the equivocation rate.
a) We first bound the equivocation rate Re as follows.
nRe = H(W |Z
n)
(a)
= H(W,W12|Z
n)
= H(W,W12)− I(W,W12;Z
n)
= I(W,W12; Y
n) +H(W,W12|Y
n)− I(W,W12;Z
n)
(b)
= I(W,W12; Y
n) +H(W |Y n)− I(W,W12;Z
n)
TO APPEAR IN IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 20
(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W,W12; Yi|Y
i−1)− I(W,W12;Zi|Zni+1) + nǫn
=
n∑
i=1
I(W,W12, Z
n
i+1; Yi|Y
i−1)− I(Zni+1; Yi|W,W12, Y
i−1)− I(W,W12, Y i−1;Zi|Zni+1)
+I(Y i−1;Zi|W,W12, Zni+1) + nǫn
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W,W12, Z
n
i+1; Yi|Y
i−1)− I(W,W12, Y i−1;Zi|Zni+1) + nǫn
=
n∑
i=1
I(Zni+1; Yi|Y
i−1) + I(W,W12; Yi|Y i−1, Zni+1)− I(Y
i−1;Zi|Zni+1)
−I(W,W12;Zi|Y
i−1, Zni+1) + nǫn
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W,W12; Yi|Y
i−1, Zni+1)− I(W,W12;Zi|Y
i−1, Zni+1) + nǫn (26)
where ǫn → 0 as n→∞; (a) and (b) follow because W12 is a function of W , (c) follows from
Fano’s inequality; and (d) and (e) follows from Lemma 7 in [3].
Let us define U¯i := Y i−1, Zni+1, V¯1,i := W,Zni+1, and V¯2,i := W12, Y i−1. We introduce a random
variable T uniformly distributed over {1, 2, · · · , n} and define U¯ := U¯T , V¯1 := V¯1,T , V¯2 := V¯2,T ,
X1 := X1,T , X2 := X2,T , Y := YT , Z := ZT . Also, we let U := (T, U¯), V1 := (T, V¯1),
V2 := (T, V¯2).
Thus, we have
Re ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(W,W12; Yi|Y
i−1, Zni+1)− I(W,W12;Zi|Y
i−1, Zni+1) + nǫn
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(W,W12, Y
i−1, Zni+1; Yi|Y
i−1, Zni+1)− I(W,W12, Y
i−1, Zni+1;Zi|Y
i−1, Zni+1) + ǫn
(f)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(V¯1,i, V¯2,i; Yi|U¯i)− I(V¯1,i, V¯2,i;Zi|U¯i) + ǫn
= I(V¯1, V¯2; Y |U¯ , T )− I(V¯1, V¯2;Z|U¯ , T ) + ǫn
= I(V¯1, V¯2, T ; Y |U¯ , T )− I(V¯1, V¯2, T ;Z|U¯ , T ) + ǫn
(g)
= I(V1, V2; Y |U)− I(V1, V2;Z|U) + ǫn (27)
where (f) follows from the definition of U¯i, V¯1,i and V¯2,i; and (g) follows from the definition
of U, V1 and V2.
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We can also bound the equivocation rate Re as follows. We continue from (26) to get
Re ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(W,W12; Yi|Y
i−1, Zni+1)− I(W,W12;Zi|Y
i−1, Zni+1) + ǫn
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(W ; Yi|W12, Y
i−1, Zni+1) + I(W12; Yi|Y
i−1, Zni+1)− I(W,W12;Zi|Y
i−1, Zni+1) + ǫn
(h)
≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(W ; Yi|W12, Y
i−1, Zni+1) +H(W12)− I(W,W12;Zi|Y
i−1, Zni+1) + ǫn
(i)
≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(W ; Yi|W12, Y
i−1, Zni+1)− I(W,W12;Zi|Y
i−1, Zni+1) + C12 + ǫn
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(W,Zni+1; Yi|W12, Y
i−1, Zni+1)− I(W,W12, Y
i−1, Zni+1;Zi|Y
i−1, Zni+1) + C12 + ǫn
(j)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(V¯1,i; Yi|V¯2,i, U¯i)− I(V¯1,i, V¯2,i;Zi|U¯i) + C12 + ǫn
= I(V¯1; Y |V¯2, U¯ , T )− I(V¯1, V¯2;Z|U¯ , T ) + C12 + ǫn
= I(V¯1, T ; Y |V¯2, U¯ , T )− I(V¯1, V¯2, T ;Z|U¯ , T ) + C12 + ǫn
(k)
= I(V1; Y |V2, U)− I(V1, V2;Z|U) + C12 + ǫn (28)
where (h) follows because I(W12; Yi|Y i−1, Zni ) ≤ H(W12|Y i−1, Zni ) ≤ H(W12), (i) follows
because H(W12) ≤
∑K
k=1H(G1k) ≤
∑K
k=1 log(|G1k|) ≤ nC12, (j) follows from the definition
of U¯i, V¯1,i and V¯2,i; and (k) follows from the definition of U, V1 and V2.
Bounds on the transmission rate.
b) We now bound the transmission rate R as follows.
nR = H(W )
(l)
= H(W,W12)
= I(W,W12; Y
n) +H(W,W12|Y
n)
(m)
= I(W,W12; Y
n) +H(W |Y n)
(n)
≤ I(W,W12; Y
n) + nǫn
=
n∑
i=1
I(W,W12; Yi|Y
i−1) + nǫn
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=
n∑
i=1
H(Yi|Y
i−1)−H(Yi|W,W12, Y i−1) + nǫn
(o)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Yi)−H(Yi|W,W12, Y
i−1) + nǫn
(p)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Yi)−H(Yi|W,W12, Y
i−1, Zni+1) + nǫn
=
n∑
i=1
I(W,W12, Y
i−1, Zni+1; Yi) + nǫn (29)
where (l) and (m) follow because W12 is a function of W , (n) follows from Fano’s inequality;
(o) and (p) follow from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy.
We continue from (29) to get
R ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(W,W12, Y
i−1, Zni+1; Yi) + ǫn
(q)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(V¯1,i, V¯2,i; Yi) + ǫn
= I(V¯1, V¯2; Y |T ) + ǫn
= I(V¯1, V¯2, T ; Y )− I(T ; Y ) + ǫn
≤ I(V¯1, V¯2, T ; Y ) + ǫn
(r)
= I(V1, V2; Y ) + ǫn (30)
where (q) follows from the definition of V¯1,i and V¯2,i; and (r) follows from the definition of V1
and V2.
We can also bound the transmission R as follows
nR = H(W )
(s)
= H(W,W12)
= H(W |W12) +H(W12)
(t)
≤ H(W |W12) + nC12
= I(W ; Y n|W12) +H(W |W12, Y
n) + nC12
(u)
≤ I(W ; Y n|W12) +H(W |Y
n) + nC12
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(v)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W ; Yi|W12, Y
i−1) + nC12 + nǫn
=
n∑
i=1
H(Yi|W12, Y
i−1)−H(Yi|W,W12, Y i−1) + nC12 + nǫn
(w)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Yi|W12, Y
i−1)−H(Yi|W,W12, Y i−1, Zni+1) + nC12 + nǫn
=
n∑
i=1
I(W,Zni+1; Yi|W12, Y
i−1) + nC12 + nǫn (31)
where (s) follows because W12 is a function of W , (t) follows because H(W12) ≤∑K
k=1H(G1k) ≤
∑K
k=1 log(|G1k|) ≤ nC12, (u) and (w) follow from the fact that conditioning
reduces entropy; and (v) follows from Fano’s inequality.
We continue from (31) to get
R ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(W,Zni+1; Yi|W12, Y
i−1) + C12 + ǫn
(x)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(V¯1,i; Yi|V¯2,i) + C12 + ǫn
= I(V¯1; Y |V¯2, T ) + C12 + ǫn
= I(V¯1, T ; Y |V¯2, T ) + C12 + ǫn
(y)
= I(V1; Y |V2) + C12 + ǫn (32)
where (x) follows from the definition of V¯1,i and V¯2,i; and (y) follows from the definition of V1
and V2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The proof is a combination of Willems’s coding scheme [24] and noise forwarding scheme
established by Lai et al. [14] with additional binning for security [1]. We begin the proof by
first setting V1 := X1, V2 := X2 in Theorem 2. After proving Theorem 2 with X1, X2, we prefix
a memoryless channel p(x1, x2|v1, v2) = p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2) as reasoned in [3, Lemma 4] to finish
the proof. Figure 6 shows the relationship between the auxiliary random variables.
Random Coding.
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1) Randomly generate a typical sequence un with probability p(un) =∏ni=1 p(ui). We assume
that all terminals know un.
2) For each un randomly generate 2nR12 independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) vn
codewords, each with probability p(vn|un) =
∏n
i=1 p(vi|ui) and index them as vn(w0),
w0 ∈ [1, 2nR12 ], where we set R12 ≤ C12.
3) For each vn(w0) generate 2nR1 conditionally i.i.d xn1 sequence, each with probability
p(xn1 |v
n(w0), u
n) =
∏n
i=1 p(x1i|vi(w0), ui), and index them as xn1 (w1, w0), w1 ∈ [1, 2nR1].
4) For each vn(w0) generate 2nR2 conditionally i.i.d xn2 sequence, each with probability
p(xn2 |v
n(w0), u
n) =
∏n
i=1 p(x2i|vi(w0), ui), and index them as xn2 (wc, w0), wc ∈ [1, 2nR2],
where we set R2 = min{I(X2; Y |V, U), I(X2;Z|X1, V, U)} − ǫ.
We define
R′′ = R′ +min{I(X2; Y |V, U), I(X2;Z|X1, V, U)} − I(X1, X2;Z|U), (33)
and R′ = R1 + R12, where W ′′ = {1, . . . , 2nR
′′
},L = {1, . . . , 2n(R
′−R′′)} and K = W ′′ × L.
In the following we assume that R′′ ≥ 0, otherwise this coding scheme does not achieve any
security level.
Encoding.
For a given rate-equivocation pair (R,Re) with R ≤ R′ and Re ≤ R, we propose the following
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random coding scheme. Let w ∈ W = {1, . . . 2nR} be the total number of message. The
stochastic encoder performs the mapping as follows.
• If R ≥ R′′, then let W = W ′′ × J where J = {1, . . . , 2n(R−R′′)}. Let g be the mapping
that partitions L into J subsets of nearly equal size. The stochastic encoder then maps
w = (w′′, j)→ (w′′, l), where l is uniformly chosen from g−1(j) ⊂ L. We define t = (w′′, l),
where t is further partition into w1 and w0 of rates R1, and R12 respectively.
• If R ≤ R′′, the stochastic encoder maps w → (w, l), where l is uniformly chosen from L.
Next we define t = (w, l), where t is further partition into w1 and w0 of rates R1, and R12
respectively.
After the mapping, Encoder 1 transmits xn1 (w1, w0) and Encoder 2 transmits xn2 (wc, w0), where
Encoder 2 randomly selects wc ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR2}.
Decoding.
The legitimate receiver performs the decoding as follows.
• After the conferencing process, Encoder 2 knows w0, if R12 ≤ C12.
• The legitimate receiver declares that (wˆ0 = w0) was sent, by looking at jointly ǫ-typical
(xn2 (wc, w0), y
n, un).
• The legitimate receiver then declares that (wˆc = wc) was sent, by looking at jointly ǫ-typical
(xn2 (wc, wˆ0), y
n, un).
• Afterwards the legitimate receiver declares that (wˆ1 = w1), if
(xn1 (w1, wˆ0), x
n
2 (wˆc, wˆ0), y
n, un) is jointly ǫ-typical.
Probability of Error Analysis.
To transmit (w1, w0) to the legitimate receiver, Encoder 1 and Encoder 2 transmit xn1 (w1, w0) and
xn2 (wc, w0) respectively. Due to the symmetry of random code construction, the average error
probability does not depends on the particular message index that was sent. Thus without loss
of generality we consider that (w1, w0) = (1, 1) was sent and define the error events
Ew1w0 = {(v
n(w0), x
n
1 (w1, w0), x
n
2 (wc, w0), y
n|un) ∈ T nǫ }.
The error occurs if the transmitted and received codewords are not jointly typical (Ec11) or when a
wrong codeword is jointly typical with the received codewords (Ew11 or Ew1w0). The probability
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of decoding an error is given by
P ne ≤ P (E
c
11) +
∑
w1 6=1,
w0=1
P (Ew11) +
∑
w1 6=1,
w0 6=1
P (Ew1w0). (34)
The first term, P (Ec11)→ 0 by AEP [31, Chapter 3]. Now we consider the second term in (34)
as follows
∑
w1 6=1,
w0=1
P (Ew11) ≤ 2
nR1
∑
(vn,xn
1
,xn
2
,
yn|un)∈Tn
ǫ
p(vn|un)p(xn1 |v
n, un)p(xn2 |v
n, un)p(yn|xn2 , v
n, un)
(a)
≤ 2nR12n(H(V,X1,X2,Y |U)+ǫ)2−n(H(V |U)−ǫ)2−n(H(X1|V,U)−2ǫ)2−n(H(X2|V,U)−2ǫ)
.2−n(H(Y |X2,V,U)−2ǫ)
= 2nR12−n[H(V |U)+H(X1|V,U)+H(X2|V,U)−5ǫ]2−n[H(Y |X2,V,U)−H(V,X1,X2,Y |U)−3ǫ]
where (a) follows from the joint AEP [31, chapter 14].
Thus if
R1 ≤H(V |U) +H(X1|V, U) +H(X2|V, U) +H(Y |X2, V, U)−H(V,X1, X2, Y |U)− 8ǫ
= I(X1; Y |X2, V, U)− 8ǫ (35)
the second term in (34) goes to zero as n→∞. From random code construction it follows that
R1 +R12 ≤ I(X1; Y |X2, V, U) + C12 − 8ǫ.
Next, we consider the third term in (34) as follows
∑
w1 6=1,
w0 6=1
P (Ew1w0) ≤ 2
n(R1+R12)
∑
(vn,xn
1
,xn
2
,
yn|un)∈Tn
ǫ
p(vn|un)p(xn1 |v
n, un)p(xn2 |v
n, un)p(yn|un)
(b)
≤ 2n(R1+R12)2n(H(V,X1,X2,Y |U)+ǫ)2−n(H(V |U)−ǫ)2−n(H(X1|V,U)−2ǫ)2−n(H(X2|V,U)−2ǫ)
.2−n(H(Y |U)−ǫ)
= 2n(R1+R12)2−n[H(V |U)+H(X1|V,U)+H(X2|V,U)−5ǫ]2−n[H(Y |U)−H(V,X1,X2,Y |U)−2ǫ]
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where (b) follows from the joint AEP [31, chapter 14].
Thus if
R1 +R12 ≤ H(V |U) +H(X1|V, U) +H(X2|V, U) +H(Y |U)−H(V,X1, X2, Y |U)− 7ǫ
= I(X1, X2, V ; Y |U)− 7ǫ
= I(X1, X2; Y |U)− 7ǫ (36)
the third term in (34) goes to zero as n→∞.
Therefore for a sufficiently large values of n, the probability of error goes to zero, if
R′ ≤ min{I(X1; Y |X2, V, U) + C12, I(X1, X2; Y |U)}.
Equivocation computation.
The computation of equivocation is given as follows.
H(W |Zn)≥H(W |Zn, Un)
=H(W,Zn|Un)−H(Zn|Un)
=H(W,V n, Xn1 , X
n
2 , Z
n|Un)−H(V n, Xn1 , X
n
2 |W,Z
n, Un)−H(Zn|Un)
=H(V n, Xn1 , X
n
2 |U
n) +H(W,Zn|V n, Xn1 , X
n
2 , U
n)−H(V n, Xn1 , X
n
2 |W,Z
n, Un)
−H(Zn|Un)
≥H(V n, Xn1 , X
n
2 |U
n) +H(Zn|V n, Xn1 , X
n
2 , U
n)−H(V n, Xn1 , X
n
2 |W,Z
n, Un)
−H(Zn|Un). (37)
We first consider H(V n, Xn1 , Xn2 |W,Zn, Un). Given W the eavesdropper only needs to decode
l, and wc, which can be decoded because
1
n
log(|R′ − R′′|) +R2 =R′ −R′ + I(X1, X2;Z|U)−min{I(X2; Y |V, U), I(X2;Z|X1, V, U)}
+min{I(X2; Y |V, U), I(X2;Z|X1, V, U)} − ǫ
≤ I(X1, X2;Z|U).
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Therefore, it can be easily shown that,
H(V n, Xn1 , X
n
2 |W,Z
n, Un) ≤ ǫ2. (38)
Since the channel is memoryless we can write
H(Zn|Un)−H(Zn|V n, Xn1 , X
n
2 , U
n)≤ nI(X1, X2, V ;Z|U) + nǫn
= nI(X1, X2;Z|U) + nǫn (39)
where ǫn → 0, as n → ∞ [1]. If R ≥ R′′ then H(V n, Xn1 , Xn2 |Un) = H(V n, Xn1 |Un) +
H(Xn2 |V
n, Xn1 , U
n) = nR′ + nR2, which follows from codebook construction. The secrecy rate
is then given by
nRe ≥ n(R
′ +R2 − I(X1, X2;Z|U)− ǫ3). (40)
If R ≤ R′′, H(V n, Xn1 , Xn2 |Un) = H(V n, Xn1 |Un) + H(Xn2 |V n, Xn1 , Un) ≥ n(R +
I(X1, X2;Z|U)− R2) + nR2 then
nRe ≥ n(R + I(X1, X2;Z|U)− I(X1, X2;Z|U)− ǫ3)
= n(R − ǫ3). (41)
Therefore, perfect secrecy is obtained.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
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